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OPINION OF THE COURT
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The matter is before the court on a petition for review
brought by BethEnergy Mines, Inc. arising from an application
filed on March 9, 1978, by John Vrobel under the Black Lung
Benefits Act, as amended, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq.

The petition

seeks review of an April 6, 1994 order of the Benefits Review
Board ("the Board") denying BethEnergy's motion for

reconsideration of a Decision and Order of the Board dated
December 29, 1992.

Vrobel was a coal miner who for approximately

34 years worked underground.

In large part Vrobel worked for

BethEnergy which last employed him on or about September 26,
1977.

Vrobel died in 1985 and his widow, Eva Vrobel, has been

substituted as a party in this case.

Thus, Eva Vrobel and the

Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs ("Director"),
are the respondents.
The Department of Labor initially awarded benefits to
Vrobel but BethEnergy denied liability and accordingly the claim
was submitted as a contested matter.

There was a formal hearing

before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on December 18, 1986.
In February 1987, BethEnergy submitted a closing statement which
contended that the evidence was insufficient to invoke the
interim presumption of total disability provided in 20 C.F.R. §
727.203(a)(1).1
1

Alternatively, BethEnergy argued that even if

. The Department of Labor has promulgated regulations
establishing an interim presumption of total disability,
applicable in this case, providing that a person who worked at
least 10 years as a coal miner is presumed to be totally disabled
by pneumoconiosis and entitled to benefits under the Act if any
of the following five requirements can be met: (1) an x-ray
reading establishes the existence of pneumoconiosis; (2)
ventilatory study measurements establish the presumption of a
chronic respiratory or pulmonary disease as numerically defined;
(3) blood gas studies reveal impairment of the flow of oxygen,
again as defined numerically; (4) other medical evidence,
including the documented opinion of a physician exercising
reasoned medical judgment establishes the presence of a total
impairment; or (5) where a miner is deceased and no medical
evidence is available, an affidavit of the survivor of the miner
or other persons with knowledge of the miner's physical
condition, demonstrates the presence of a totally disabling
respiratory or pulmonary impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(1)
(1994).

the interim presumption was invoked, the evidence established
that it had been rebutted.
In a decision issued on April 30, 1987, the ALJ found
that Vrobel demonstrated that the interim presumption should be
invoked under 20 C.F.R. §727.203(a)(1) on the basis of x-ray
evidence establishing the existence of pneumoconiosis.

The ALJ

further found that BethEnergy failed to establish rebuttal of the
presumption under 20 C.F.R. § 727.203 (b)(1), (b)(3) or (b)(4).2
(..continued)
The party opposing entitlement may then rebut the
interim presumption in four different ways. 20 C.F.R. §
727.203(b)(1)-(4). The two methods of rebuttal which are most
relevant to this case are as follows:
(b) Rebuttal of interim presumption. In
adjudicating a claim under this subpart, all
relevant medical evidence shall be
considered. The presumption in paragraph (a)
of this section shall be rebutted if:
. . .
(2) In light of all relevant
evidence it is established that the
individual is able to do his usual
coal mine work or comparable
gainful work ...; or
(3) The evidence establishes
that the total disability or death
of the miner did not arise in whole
or in part out of coal mine
employment.
2

.
In invoking the interim presumption based on the evidence
of several positive x-ray readings, the ALJ applied a nowdiscredited theory which allowed invocation of the interim
presumption to be based upon a single piece of qualifying
evidence, with contrary evidence being weighed only on rebuttal.
Stapleton v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 785 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1986),
rev'd sub nom. Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135,
108 S.Ct. 427 (1987). The Supreme Court in Mullins rejected this
theory which we had followed in Revak v. National Mines Corp.,
808 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986), as the Court held that all relevant
evidence, including conflicting evidence, must be weighed when

However, the ALJ found that BethEnergy could establish rebuttal
under (b)(2) because from a pulmonary standpoint Vrobel could
perform his usual coal mine employment or comparable gainful
work.

In addition, the ALJ determined that an opinion of a Dr.

McQuillan that Vrobel did not have a totally disabling
respiratory impairment was supported by the opinions of two other
doctors who examined Vrobel.

App. at 152.

As a result, the ALJ

denied Vrobel benefits.
Eva Vrobel then appealed to the Board, arguing that
Vrobel's pulmonary impairment prevented him from working and,
accordingly, the ALJ erroneously had found that BethEnergy
established (b)(2) rebuttal.

In its answering brief BethEnergy

argued that even if the Board found that in view of Kertesz v.
Crescent Hills Coal Co., 788 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1986), the ALJ's
initial finding of rebuttal was inappropriate, the evidence
nevertheless demonstrated that Vrobel's disability was unrelated
to coal mine employment, thereby establishing (b)(3) rebuttal.
App. at 122-23.

Kertesz held that the causation of a miner's

total disability is not relevant in determining whether there was
rebuttal under (b)(2).

Id. at 162 n.5.

Instead, a finding of

any totally disabling contention will preclude (b)(2) rebuttal.

(..continued)
deciding to invoke the presumption in the first place. Mullins,
484 U.S. at 148-150, 108 S.Ct. at 433-36. The ALJ later refused
a request by BethEnergy to reexamine the invocation of the (a)(1)
presumption under the post-Mullins standard. Nevertheless, we
need not address this issue because BethEnergy does not challenge
the ALJ's refusal in this appeal.

As BethEnergy anticipated, the Board remanded the case
on December 30, 1988, for the ALJ to reconsider rebuttal under
(b)(2) pursuant to Kertesz, and it also instructed the ALJ to
reconsider rebuttal under (b)(3) pursuant to Bernardo v.
Director, OWCP, 790 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1986).

App. at 113.

In

Bernardo, we determined that rebuttal under (b)(3) solely relates
to the source of the miner's total disability, and not the degree
of disability.

Thus, the pneumoconiosis need not be the

exclusive source of the disability.
On March 13, 1989, the ALJ in his Decision and Order on
Remand awarded benefits to Vrobel.

App. at 108.

The ALJ found

that BethEnergy failed to establish rebuttal under (b)(2) as
Vrobel had a shoulder condition that could have been totally
disabling.

App. at 108.

In addition, the ALJ determined that

BethEnergy failed to establish (b)(3) rebuttal because the
medical evidence in the record supported a finding that Vrobel's
total disability at least partly was associated with his coal
mine employment.

Consequently, BethEnergy failed to establish

that there was no significant relationship between the total
disability and coal mine employment.

App. at 109.

On April 11, 1989, BethEnergy filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that the ALJ's finding in the initial
Decision and Order under (b)(2), i.e. that Vrobel was not totally
disabled due to a respiratory or pulmonary impairment, was
sufficient to establish rebuttal under (b)(3).3
3

BethEnergy

.
In other words, BethEnergy claimed that inasmuch as the ALJ
initially found that Vrobel's total disability was unrelated to a

further asserted that (b)(2) rebuttal was satisfied because the
evidence had failed to establish that Vrobel was totally disabled
as a result of any condition.

App. at 74.

In addition,

BethEnergy alleged for the first time that changes in the
interpretation of (b)(2) and (b)(3) had affected adversely its
defense of the claim and it requested an opportunity to submit
additional evidence.4

App. at 68.

On reconsideration, in a

Decision and Order of July 5, 1989, the ALJ rejected BethEnergy's
argument concerning total disability under (b)(2) and reiterated
that BethEnergy failed to establish that Vrobel was not totally
disabled from any condition.

However, the ALJ determined that

(b)(3) rebuttal was established.

In reaching this conclusion,

the ALJ applied Marcum v. Director, OWCP, 11 Black Lung Rep. (MB)
(..continued)
respiratory or pulmonary impairment, (b)(3) rebuttal could be
established because the absence of any significant pulmonary or
respiratory impairment precludes pneumoconiosis as a cause of
total disability. App. at 75. Thus, in BethEnergy's view, there
was no significant relationship between the total disability and
coal mine employment.
4

.
In particular, BethEnergy asserts that Kertesz, which we
decided on April 14, 1986, changed the legal standard for
establishing rebuttal under (b)(2). BethEnergy argues that it
developed its medical evidence according to the pre-Kertesz
standards, which required a showing that the claimant left work
because of a respiratory related problem. As such, BethEnergy
claims that it was unnecessary to develop further evidence
regarding (b)(3) rebuttal because "the pre-Kertesz rule obviated
the need to prove that disabling conditions that were not
respiratory in origin did not 'arise in whole or part out of coal
mine employment.'" (Quoting (b)(3)). Brief at 14. Since
BethEnergy apparently had developed evidence tending to
illustrate that Vrobel's total disability was non-respiratory in
nature, it argues that it should be permitted to develop
additional evidence addressing the post-Kertesz standards
affecting (b)(2) and (b)(3) rebuttal.

1-23 (1987).

Construing Marcum, the ALJ stated that (b)(3)

rebuttal could be invoked "if the weight of the evidence
establishes that the Claimant did not have a totally disabling
pulmonary or respiratory impairment."5

App. at 58.

The ALJ then

adopted his finding in the initial decision that there was no
medical evidence which established a totally disabling
respiratory impairment.

App. at 58.

Consequently the ALJ

determined that application of the Marcum standard precluded a
recovery of benefits.
Vrobel appealed to the Board, claiming that the ALJ's
finding that BethEnergy established (b)(3) rebuttal was erroneous
because he incorrectly applied the (b)(3) rebuttal standard.
Vrobel further argued that proper application of Bernardo would
illustrate that BethEnergy could not establish (b)(3) rebuttal,
just as the ALJ previously determined when he applied the correct
standard in the Decision and Order on remand.

On April 11, 1990,

BethEnergy responded, asserting that the ALJ's (b)(3) rebuttal
finding on reconsideration was correct because the physicians'
opinions contained in the record ruled out any relationship
between coal dust exposure and disability, thereby addressing the
source of the miner's disability.
5

App. at 45-47.

.
This standard is incorrect as Bernardo v. Director, OWCP,
790 F.2d at 353, set forth the controlling law with respect to
(b)(3) rebuttal at the time the ALJ decided this case. Bernardo
establishes that (b)(3) is concerned with the source of
disability and not the degree. Id. In other words, Bernardo
requires an inquiry into the causation of the disability. It
should be noted, however, that the ALJ properly cited and applied
Bernardo in his Decision and Order on Remand in which he awarded
benefits to Vrobel. App. at 113.

On December 29, 1992, the Board determined that the ALJ
applied the wrong standard when he concluded that rebuttal was
established under (b)(3).

The Board reasoned that inasmuch as

the ALJ found that Vrobel had a respiratory impairment arising
out of coal mine employment, app. at 109, 153, the issue to
decide, in accordance with Carozza v. United States Steel Corp.,
727 F.2d 74, 78 (3d Cir. 1984), was whether this respiratory
impairment was a contributing cause of the miner's total
disability or whether it aggravated his total disability.6
at 37.

App.

As we explained in Kline v. Director, OWCP, 877 F.2d

1175, 1179 (3d Cir. 1989), for rebuttal under (b)(3) "it is
necessary to 'rule out' a possible causal connection between a
miner's disability and his coal mine employment."
The Board then stated that the ALJ properly had
considered (b)(3) rebuttal in his initial Decision and Order on
Remand, in which he awarded benefits.

The Board indicated that

in the ALJ's decision on reconsideration he had applied the wrong
test when he held that (b)(3) rebuttal was established since
Vrobel did not have a totally disabling pulmonary or respiratory
impairment.

Furthermore, the Board noted that the ALJ credited

the medical opinions that Vrobel had a pulmonary impairment
arising out of his coal mine employment, thereby justifying a
determination that BethEnergy failed to show that there was "no
6

.
As we discussed earlier, Bernardo requires an inquiry into
the source of the miner's total disability. See note 5, supra.
Carozza, in combination with Bernardo, requires that a party
opposing entitlement must demonstrate that pneumoconiosis is not
a contributing or aggravating cause of the disability.

significant relationship" between disability and coal mine
employment.

Id. at 37.

The Board also concluded that because

BethEnergy failed to meet the "no significant relationship" test,
which it regarded as less stringent and more easily met than the
Carozza no "contribution standard," the ALJ's initial finding
precluded rebuttal under Carozza.

Therefore, the Board reversed

the ALJ's finding of (b)(3) rebuttal and awarded benefits.
On January 25, 1993, BethEnergy requested that the
Board reconsider its award of benefits to Vrobel.

It premised

this request on two arguments: (1) due process and fundamental
fairness require that BethEnergy be given an opportunity to
develop new evidence to address the standard for establishing
(b)(2) and (b)(3) rebuttal, which allegedly changed during the
litigation of Vrobel's claim; and (2) the Supreme Court's
decision in Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135, 108
S.Ct. 427 (1987), concerning the invocation of the interim
presumption of total disability under C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(1)
warranted reconsideration by the ALJ.

App. at 31-32.

denied BethEnergy's motion on April 6, 1994.

The Board

App. at 25.

On this petition, BethEnergy challenges the Board's
denial of its motion for reconsideration.

In particular,

BethEnergy asserts that it never has been granted an opportunity
to have the medical evidence which it has developed interpreted
to satisfy the proper burdens for establishing rebuttal under
(b)(2) and (b)(3).

II.

DISCUSSION

A.

The Standard of Review

We review the decisions of the Board for errors of law
and to assure that it has adhered to its own standard of review.
Director, OWCP v. Barnes and Tucker Co., 969 F.2d 1524, 1526-27
(3d Cir. 1992).

Thus, our inquiry is limited to a determination

of whether the Board acted in conformity with applicable law and
within its proper scope of review.
Coal Co., 788 F.2d at 162-63.
determinations is plenary.

Kertesz v. Crescent Hills

Our review of the Board's legal

Barnes and Tucker Co., 969 F.2d at

1526-27; Carozza v. United States Steel Corp., 727 F.2d at 77.
Of course, the Board must accept an ALJ's findings of fact if
they are supported by substantial evidence in the record
considered as a whole.

33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3); Oravitz v.

Director, OWCP, 843 F.2d 738, 739 (3d Cir. 1988).
B.

BethEnergy's Claims

BethEnergy argues that it is entitled to a new hearing
to respond to a change in the law that invalidated its rebuttal
proof.

It bases this assertion on two arguments.

First, it

claims that the Board violated its statutory authority by
engaging in de novo fact finding.

Second, it asserts that its

due process rights were violated when the Board refused to reopen
the record to afford it an opportunity to develop evidence to
address new standards of proof regarding rebuttal under (b)(2)
and (b)(3).

Both arguments lack merit.
1.

De Novo Fact Finding

BethEnergy asserts that the Board overstepped its
statutory authority by making factual findings regarding (b)(2)

and (b)(3) rebuttal.

In particular, it claims that because the

ALJ found that Vrobel retained the pulmonary capacity to perform
his usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful work, it had
established (b)(2) rebuttal.

Brief at 12.

It then asserts that

the Board engaged in fact finding in rejecting (b)(2) rebuttal.
We reject this argument as it has no factual or legal support in
the record.
As the Director points out, the ALJ found that
BethEnergy established (b)(2) rebuttal only in his initial
Decision and Order.

However, as the Director also notes, he

reached this conclusion by applying the wrong rebuttal standard.
After the Board remanded the case with instructions to apply the
proper (b)(2) rebuttal standard in accordance with Kertesz, the
ALJ specifically found that (b)(2) rebuttal was not established.
App. at 58, 108.

Furthermore, the Board never upset the finding

by the ALJ concerning BethEnergy's lack of proof to establish
(b)(2) rebuttal under the proper standard.
BethEnergy also claims that the Board engaged in de
novo fact finding when it reversed the ALJ's finding that
BethEnergy established (b)(3) rebuttal.

The argument is that

once the Board determined that the ALJ applied the wrong standard
on reconsideration the Board should have remanded the case to the
ALJ with instructions to review the evidence under the correct
standard.

BethEnergy claims that the Board instead weighed the

evidence de novo, and concluded that BethEnergy did not establish
rebuttal under the post-Kertesz standards.

In BethEnergy's view,

these actions were beyond the Board's statutory powers, and, as
such, warrant a remand of the case.
The Director argues that the Board did not engage in de
novo fact finding, but only reinstated the ALJ's initial findings
made on remand.

In particular, the Director claims that (b)(3)

rebuttal was precluded because BethEnergy failed to establish
that there was no significant relationship between the total
disability and Vrobel's coal mine employment.

App. at 109.

In view of the parties' contentions we consider whether
the Board engaged in de novo fact finding when it reversed the
ALJ's decision regarding (b)(3) rebuttal.

The Board's power to

hear disputes concerning claims under the Black Lung Benefits Act
is derived from 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3), which provides:
The Board shall be authorized to hear and
determine appeals raising a substantial
question of law or fact taken by any party in
interest from decisions with respect to
claims of employees under this chapter and
the extensions thereof.

(Emphasis supplied.)

The statutory language has been interpreted to prohibit the Board
from making a de novo factual review, Oravitz v. Director, OWCP,
738 F.2d at 739, instead requiring it to accept an ALJ's findings
unless they are contrary to law, irrational, or unsupported by
substantial evidence in the record.

King v. Director, OWCP, 904

F.2d 17, 18 (9th Cir. 1990); Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
Krecota, 868 F.2d 600, 603 (3d Cir. 1989).
802.301.

See also 20 C.F.R §

The proper (b)(3) rebuttal standard requires that the
party opposing entitlement demonstrate that the miner's
respiratory impairment was not a contributing cause of his total
disability or did not aggravate his total disability.
727 F.2d at 78.

Carozza,

The Board determined that BethEnergy did not

meet this standard.
In reversing the ALJ, the Board acted within the scope
of its delegated powers to make legal determinations because the
decision of the ALJ on reconsideration on remand that BethEnergy
established (b)(3) rebuttal as Vrobel did not have a totally
disabling pulmonary or respiratory impairment was clearly
contrary to law.

BethEnergy argues that the case should have

been remanded to the ALJ for a proper application of the Carozza
standard.

While the Board could have remanded the matter, we

hardly can fault it for bringing these protracted proceedings to
a close.

Indeed, we followed a similar course in Sulyma v.

Director, OWCP, 827 F.2d 922, 924 (3d Cir. 1987).

In that case

the Director conceded on appeal in this court that the claimant
was entitled to the interim presumption of total disability
denied in the administrative proceedings.

However, the Director

sought a remand of the case for consideration of whether the
presumption had been rebutted.

But we would not remand the case.

Rather, "in consideration of the age of" the case, we relied on
our own view of the record and concluded that the presumption had
not been rebutted.

Here, the Board took even less intrusive

action as, rather than drawing factual conclusions, it accepted

and applied the ALJ's previous factual finding, made under the
correct legal standard.
When the Board reversed the ALJ's determination that
(b)(3) rebuttal had been established, it recognized that
BethEnergy could not satisfy the Carozza requirement for (b)(3)
rebuttal.

It based this conclusion on the reasoning that because

the ALJ determined that BethEnergy could not establish that there
was "no significant relationship" between Vrobel's total
disability and his coal mine employment, BethEnergy could not
establish that the miner's pneumoconiosis was not a "contributing
cause" of disability.

App. at 37.

We regard the Board's

conclusion as logically unassailable.

Indeed, the Board believed

that it is easier to establish that there is no significant
relationship between the total disability and the employment than
it is to establish that pneumoconisis is not a contributing cause
to the disability.
We acknowledge that evaluation of medical evidence is
entrusted to the ALJ.

As we noted in Caprini v. Director, OWCP,

824 F.2d 283, 285 (3d Cir. 1987):
[t]he ALJ should first have the opportunity
to consider the evidence, make his ruling,
and state his reasons. The Board may then
consider the matter if the aggrieved party
wishes to appeal.
But the proceeding in this case fully comported with Caprini as
the ALJ made the critical factual determinations on the basis of
the record.

Thus, a remand was not necessary as ". . . the

record [was] so clear that under the correct standard the result

[was] foreordained."

Id.

See also Drummond Coal Co. v. Freeman,

17 F.3d 361 (11th Cir. 1994) (court of appeals may reinstate
findings of ALJ overturned by Board); Sykes v. Director, OWCP,
812 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1987) (same).

In order to justify a

remand the Board would had to have concluded that the ALJ might
deviate from his prior finding.

The Board had no reason to reach

such a conclusion.
2.

The Due Process Argument

BethEnergy asserts that due process of law requires
that it be afforded an opportunity to develop evidence to address
new standards of proof regarding rebuttal under (b)(2) and
(b)(3).

In this regard BethEnergy claims that our opinion in

Kertesz on April 14, 1986, effectively changed the legal standard
for establishing rebuttal under (b)(2) but that BethEnergy
developed its medical evidence in 1983.
We see no need for an extended discussion on this point
as BethEnergy clearly had an opportunity to develop evidence
under the Kertesz standard for we decided that case on April 14,
1986, and the initial hearing before the ALJ in this matter was
on December 18, 1986.

Furthermore, BethEnergy could have sought

even more time under 20 C.F.R. § 725.454 to prepare its case but
it did not do so.

In these circumstances BethEnergy's due

process argument is insubstantial.
In reaching this conclusion we have not overlooked Marx
v. Director, OWCP, 870 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1989), on which
BethEnergy relies.

But Marx is not helpful to BethEnergy.

That

case involved a situation in which a party presented her case in

conformity with practice existing at the time of the hearing.
However, following the hearing there was a change in the
applicable law.

In those circumstances we held that the claimant

was entitled to a remand to "have the opportunity to introduce
evidence which satisfies [the new] standard."

Thus, Marx does

not support an argument that a litigant should be entitled to a
remand to meet standards established before a hearing.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the petition for review
is denied.

